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Abstract: In this article, I return to the ‘over-interpreted anxiety dream’ (Copjec, 
2015) of ‘Irma’s Injection’ to make a wider claim concerning an unacknowledged 
investment in structure that I understand to return to Žižekian appeals to the 
disruptive structure of the Real.  I begin with the analysis of Freud’s first specimen 
dream, and Lacan’s response to this, offered by Joan Copjec, Žižek’s fellow traveller 
in theory. My concern is with Copjec’s staging of the encounter with the Real, both in 
its imaginary and symbolic modes, and the extent to which a renewed focus on the 
narrational frames of psychoanalytic accounts of ‘Irma’s Injection’ can help bring to 
light their otherwise neglected appeals to structure.. Rather than a simple 
deconstructive evasion of the Real, I argue that such a move enables a questioning 
the location of the limit within Copjec’s account of ‘Irma’s Injection’: a return of the 
Real to the Real. This discussion results also in a more straightforward reassessment 
of the understanding of structure in ‘Irma’s Injection’ as read by both Copjec and 
Žižek. I focus on one particular aspect, ‘flight’, understood to be: central to the 
structure of the dream; disruptive to this structure; a remaining and an escape; 
evasion and fidelity. Through the frame of ‘flight’, I re-evaluate the dream within/ 
across the work of Žižek and Copjec before, finally, contemplating how ‘flight’ might 
help to refigure the relationship between the two theorists, and the deconstructive 
practice that both question within their various responses to ‘Irma’s Injection.   
 





i) Introduction: Irma again. 
  
Irma again. But will this be a repetition held within a structure of fantasy, a deferral foolishly 
holding out for an end? Or is it instead to be an insistence, a carving out of an abyss, one 
that cares nothing for an answering voice?  And what structures must be called upon, and 
what left unengaged, if we are to go one way or another?  
 
ii) an ‘over-interpreted anxiety dream’ 
 
 Let us begin by returning to the familiar ground of the dream of ‘Irma’s Injection’. Freud 
opens the first extended self-analysis within The Interpretation of Dreams with a description 
a large hall, where he is receiving guests, and talking to a patient, Irma. Irma is unconvinced 
by the psychoanalytic solution to her health problems suggested by Freud, and he is 
concerned he might have overlooked an organic cause to her condition. Looking down her 
throat, he sees: ‘a large white spot to the right, and […] extended grayish-white scabs 
attached to curious curling formations, which have obviously been formed like the turbinated 
bone’ (Freud 2001: 107). Three medical friends join him, and offer their diagnosis, with 
Freud concluding:  
 
 I quickly call Dr. M, who repeats the examination and confirms it.... Dr. M looks quite 
unlike his usual self; he is very pale, he limps, and his chin is clean-shaven.... Now my 
friend Otto, too, is standing beside her, and my friend Leopold percusses her covered 
chest, and says ‘She has a dullness below, on the left,’ and also calls attention to an 
infiltrated portion of skin on the left shoulder (which I can feel, in spite of the dress).... 
M says: ‘There's no doubt that it's an infection […]My friend Otto, not long ago, gave 
her, when she was feeling unwell, an injection of a preparation of propyl... propyls... 
propionic acid... trimethylamin (the formula of which I see before me, printed in heavy 
type).... One doesn't give such injections so rashly.... Probably, too, the syringe was 
not clean. (Ibid.)   
 
 Why return? Freud’s specimen dream is so well-worn in psychoanalytic criticism that Joan 
Copjec’s twenty seven year old assessment of an ‘over-interpreted anxiety dream’ has itself 
become familiar (Copjec 2015: 119; Sigler 2010). As my intention here is finally to engage 
Žižekian readings of ‘Irma’s Injection’, as well as wider questions of Žižekian analysis, one 
place to start, I would contend,  is precisely with this idea of over-interpretation. For Copjec, 
in a reading whose relation to Žižekian thought is to be the focus of my thinking, this is not a 
matter of simple exhaustion: it would be wrong, for example, to think that, through being 
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over-interpreted, there is a degree of interpretation that would have sufficed. The dream is 
understood by Copjec to begin with an anxiety producing encounter, the view down the 
throat. This is a meeting with the real that produces an ‘affect’ that ‘cannot be doubted’, and 
‘which nothing proceeds’, it having ‘neither an essence nor a signification, a signal [that] 
works without the use of any signifiers’ (118-19). i From such claims, it follows that ‘any 
interpretation of anxiety is superfluous and inappropriate’ (119), and any engagement with 
‘Irma’s Injection’ that does not recognise this fails as a psychoanalytic response.    
 
 For Copjec, ‘Irma’s Injection’ offers a lesson in the ‘proper response’ involves ‘flee[ing]’ or 
‘flight’,’ from the traumatic scene (123; 120). Later in this article, I will be interested in 
thinking through how the question of ‘flight’ might impact on a comparative reading of 
appeals to structure in the work of Copjec, Žižek, and certain theorists that they set 
themselves against. For now, I will limit myself to a more straightforward introduction to 
Copjec’s account of ‘turning away’ in a dream that she takes to be split between the horrific 
encounter with Irma’s throat and the comic medical interpretations that follow (120). In this 
understanding, in the second part of the dream, the real of anxiety is registered only in the 
‘failure of the symbolic reality’, and thus no interpretation is offered (119). That is the 
explanation for the ironic notion that fleeing the real is essential to psychoanalytic practice: 
unlike conventional ‘interpretation’, which seeks symbolic supplementation when confronted 
by the real (explanations drawn from other fields that seek to domesticate the disturbing 
threat of anxiety), the flight into the absurdity of the symbolic cannot help but keep hold of 
the real that has no secure place within its exchanges. What is proposed is not a repudiation 
of the real, not an embrace of the symbolic’s endless chain of signification, but a recognition 
of the gap or limit necessary to that process: one should neither respond to an other with 
historicist contextualisation  (working with the fundamental fantasy that a given supplement 
will complete the other, making it explicable),  nor a deconstructive reading of their words  
(the hope that constitutive tensions can be tracked in the open-ended play of meaning, with 
no regard to the limit that language carves out and requires). It is claimed that such options 
involve fleeing the anxiety inducing encounter with the real in the wrong way, a foreclosing of 
the real, rather than its registration through negation. The theoretical approach favoured 
within ‘Vampires, Breast-Feeding, and Anxiety’, the chapter within Copjec’s Read my Desire 
that I am concerned with in this article, rather ‘urge[s] analysts of culture to become literate 
in desire, to learn how to read what is inarticulable in cultural statements’, not to limit 
themselves to a reading of the ‘literal’ text, but to take into account the ‘real structure’ and 
the gaps of desire that this text registers. (12) My contention is that, despite the commitment 
to reading, and the acknowledgement of the importance of symbolic frames, Copjec’s 
seemingly non-interpretive theoretical response results in a generalised approach to ‘Irma’s 
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Injection’ and the various other texts (from vampire fiction to Kantian aesthetics) that are 
understood to be its equivalent: genres are introduced through single texts, quotation is rare, 
textual engagement is predominantly at the level of plot, and structure is variously: 
overlooked; an aspect of the symbolic that is unquestionable (‘there seems to be only one 
reading of this narrative pacing’ [125]); unquestionable also as an aspect of the real that can 
nonetheless be read.   
 
iii) ‘…the real – Irma, her white scabs, the unconscious –’ 
 
 To initiate this questioning reading of  ‘Vampires, Breast-Feeding, and Anxiety’, I turn to 
Copjec’s account of Jacques Lacan’s celebrated framing of the dream:  
  
The dream is divided by Lacan into two parts, each of which is marked by its own 
climax. In the first part, Freud appears as a man free of any ‘Oedipus complex’; his 
research is driven entirely by his desire to know, whatever the cost. Propelled by this 
desire, he stalks his party guest, Irma, and, struggling against her resistances, peers 
curiously down her throat, only to make his truly horrible discovery. What he witnesses 
is the very ‘origin of the world,’ the equivalent of the female genitals. It is clear that the 
uncanny appearance of what ought to have remained hidden is a sickening, noxious 
sight. But what is it, really? ‘A large white spot….curled structures….white-grey scabs.’ 
Almost nothing. This is the climax of the first part of the dream, the anxiety-filled 
encounter with the object a.  
 
After this encounter the dream switches to another mode [….] the second part of the 
dream is defined by a turning away from the object a that erupted in the first part […] 
The abruptness of the transition indicates that Freud flees from the real – Irma, her 
white scabs, the unconscious – into the symbolic community of his fellow doctors. 
(Copjec 2025: 120) 
 
 Expanding upon this description of the ‘anxiety filled encounter’, Copjec claims that to look 
down the throat is to witness ‘a point that interpretation, the logic of cause and effect, cannot 
bridge’ (126). Again, it is to meet the real, experienced as an anxiety ‘affect’ that cannot be 
doubted. This real is the ‘very origin of the world’ because it is ‘prior’ to pathology and 
sentiment; a failure of  the ‘symbolic reality wherein all alienable objects, objects that can be 
given or taken away, lost and refound, are constituted and circulate’ (119; 126). Copjec 




somewhat perverse[…] that Lacan should refer to this ‘lack of a lack’ as an encounter 
with an object: object a. But this object is unique. It has neither essence nor a 
signification. It cannot be communicated or exchanged. It has, in short, no objectivity. 
(119) 
 
  I will begin with what I take to be a problematic appeal to origins: the claim that Freud, on 
looking down Irma’s throat, ‘witnesses […] the very “origin of the world”’. This is an origin 
that can be seen for what it is from a point of view other than its own, a witnessed origin, and 
I read in this the difficulty of conceiving of a narrational perspective that can access a state 
that is free from supplement.  
 
 There is a further issue with the supplement at this stage, in so far as the very ‘“origin of the 
world’” that is witnessed is ‘the equivalent of female genitals’. The origin, as witnessed, has 
‘equivalence’, it is divided, substitutive, ‘alienable’, and thus, in one sense, something other 
than real as understood by Copjec above. An additional and comparable difficulty can be 
introduced here, as what is witnessed is not ‘really’ the ‘“origin of the world’”, but something 
else, and that is, finally, ‘almost nothing’. ‘Almost’, because of its status as object a, yet the 
irony of the object, I would suggest, cannot be corralled within its lack of essence, that is, in 
the specific sense in which it is ‘not an object’ (119). Although in the first part of the dream 
Copjec’s claim is that we are dealing only with the object a and its eruption, there the a-
symbolic real is encountered in an object that can be separated into parts, a ‘large white 
spot….curled structures….white-grey scabs’. Even for Copjec, the ‘almost nothing’ is thus 
divided from within. As some of these parts have ‘structures’, a notion of form is introduced. 
What, we might ask, determines ‘structure’, at this stage? What is the law of structure at this 
point in the analysis? And, going forward: how is this structure related to the further 
structures upon which Copjec calls?  
 
 The interest in the object a, for Copjec, might suggest an alternative reading, as it is her 
contention, as we know, that the symbolic registers the real. The claim is that although the 
Lacanian real cannot be included in the symbolic, it is signified in so far as it is what 
symbolic repetitions miss. The dream is thus not simply a movement from the real to the 
symbolic, but from the real to the symbolic that registers the inaccessible real (121 – 122). It 
is important to stress here, therefore, that Copjec’s argument is that Freud has not entered 
the ‘space’ of the symbolic during its initial moments. The real as it is encountered through 
the symbolic’s failure to meet it is, therefore, located strictly in the second part of the dream.    
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 To begin to challenge these constructions of the real and the structural in Copjec’s analysis, 
I am interested in following Lacan’s own instruction when reading Freud’s account of the 
injection dream: ‘You must start from the text, start by treating it as Holy Writ’ (Lacan 1988: 
153). If we return to Lacan’s text, and turn to the description of the anxious encounter in his 
second lecture on the dream that is glossed within Copjec’s account, we read what he – but 
never Freud  - figures as ‘the horrendous sight’ of the throat, set out in the following terms:  
 
The mouth has all the equivalences in terms of significations that you want. Everything 
blends in and becomes associated in this image […] There’s a horrendous discovery 
here, that of the flesh one never sees, the foundation of things, the other side of the 
head, of the face, the secretory glands par excellence, the flesh from which everything 
exudes, at the very heart of the mystery, the flesh in as much as it is suffering, is 
formless, in as much as its form in itself is something which promotes anxiety. Spectre 
of anxiety, identification of anxiety, the final revelation of you are this  - You are this, 
which is so far from you , this which is the ultimate formlessness (154) 
 
 I can certainly see why the appeal here might be to an anxiety inducing encounter with the 
real, with an unfathomable, formless or shapeless origin. As I read it, however, this real is 
not resistant to analysis simply because it has never had a place in the symbolic 
organisation. Within the specific formulation Lacan offers, what one sees, the horrendous 
sight, is of ‘the flesh one never sees’ (my italics. ‘Celle de la chair qu’on ne voit jamais’) 
(Lacan 1978, 186). Impossible seeing. More impossible still: from this flesh, ‘everything 
exudes’ (‘la chair dont tout sort’), yet how, if the flesh must of necessity fall within the 
category of everything?  The flesh is formless, yet this state is dependent on ‘its form in itself’ 
and all that this provokes, that is, a ghostly anxiety. This is a final revelation, one that splits 
the ‘you’, requiring, in its formlessness - that is, in its radical upsetting of the ‘you’ - a division. 
‘You’ are positioned, in so far as the ‘this’ that is your other ‘is so far away from you’, yet the 
‘this’ is also the ‘you’ that is positioned against it (‘tu es ceci ,  qui est le plus loin de toi, ceci 
qui est le plus informe’). ‘Ultimate formlessness’, it would seem, does indeed require form. 
‘You’ are not in your right place. ‘You’ are in the very place of the other that is necessary for 
the independent position of ‘you’. I read in this not simply the real as void, the lack of a lack 
in the symbolic that can be secured, somehow, without reference to the specificity of text, 
but instead a constitutive impossibility to be read in Lacan’s narration. The condition of not 
having a determinate place within the symbolic is not enjoyed only by the ‘element’ that has 
nothing to do with it. Instead, I read textuality turned against itself; a senselessness 




 It might be suggested that the reading I offer here only confirms the Žižekian Real Real: ‘At 
its most elementary, the Real is non-identity itself, the impossibility for X to be (come) fully 
itself’: the flesh turned against itself; the origin of the world, with its divisions that cannot 
lodge within the give and take of the symbolic ( Žižek 2013: 380); the real precisely as 
excess, but also as impossible, divided origin (473–74). I am, however, interested in the 
difficulty of keeping this real from deferral, of assuring the purity of its impossibility within a 
reading of the Lacanian and Freudian texts. ii 
 
 With this in mind, let us return, for a moment, to the questions of origins. In my 
understanding of Lacan’s formulation, ‘the foundation of things’ is haunted by the things it 
supports. The first moment is necessarily retrospective. Just like ‘the other side of the head’ 
(my italics), it cannot be taken on its own terms. This is one reason why the encounter will 
always be with ‘almost nothing’, and why this should not be understood as an absence, or an 
absence of absence, but, instead, a point of supreme density: ‘the mouth has all the 
equivalences in terms of significations, all the condensations you could want’. The mouth is 
not the pure site of affect, with ‘the real [as] Irma, her white scabs’, but something over-
determined, having an abundance of signification that, even as it is held out of reach of one’s 
wanting through the modal ‘could’, threatens the lack that constitutes desire. Caught up with 
this, however, is the counter sense that it is the very abundance of condensations that usher 
in the lack. The uncertainty concerning ‘equivalence’ at this point is not surprising when 
taking into consideration  Lacan’s original formulation:: ‘Il y a à cette bouche toutes les 
significations d’équivalence, toutes les condensations que vous voudrez. Tout se mêle et 
s’associe dans cette image, de la bouche à l’organe sexuel féminin’ (Lacan 1978: 186). The 
mouth has all the equivalent meanings you will want, to be sure, but also, all the meanings of 
equivalence.  ‘Equivalence’ is itself constructed through equivalence. It does not escape the 
effects of its own structure, and ‘content’ and ‘form’ thus fail to keep at a safe distance from 
each other. I read in this the impossibility of shielding ‘equivalence’ from the touch of 
meaning, that is, from deferral. iii 
 
  Crucially, my contention again is that the divisions of ‘equivalence’ cannot be questioned in 
Copjec’s account, because what are taken to be the two ‘parts’ of the dream must be kept 
distinct: however much the symbolic registers the real in the second part of the dream, there 
really can be nothing of the symbolic in Freud’s encounter with Irma’s throat. The force of 
Copjec’s subsequent argument is dependent on the certainty of separation at this point.  
 
It is with this in mind that I turn again, and with renewed insistence, to what is, perhaps, the 
most obvious sense in which the symbolic returns to the spaces of the dream: the encounter 
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is always recounted. Freud flees the scene, but only from the perspective of Freud narrating 
this event; if the ‘I’ flees or looks, it is through the doubling of a narrating ‘I’ that is not doing 
these things. It is not only, as Lacan makes clear, that the fleeing of Freud cannot be taken 
in isolation from the dream, that state in which the motor discharge of flight is prohibited, but 
additionally that neither dream nor event can be separated in a reading from the linguistic 
frame. At certain stages, Lacan can be understood to acknowledge this, and Copjec herself 
repeats with approval Lacan’s condemnation of the ‘failure to distinguish the enunciative 
position of the dreaming patient from the stated position of the dreamed one’ (Copjec [1994]: 
24). For Copjec, analysis is, however, to focus on the ‘space’ of the dream, the ‘second, 
Oedipalized space’, for example (120). At issue, in my reading, is that this space is never 
somehow simply itself, constituted as it is within a retrospective narration, from a 
supplementary yet necessary perspective. 
 
iv) The death drive that is not one 
 
 If we are to engage narrational frames, then an additional difficulty with the notion of a non-
symbolic encounter is introduced: I take Copjec to read the account of the dream in terms of 
a structure that insists.  The dream is divided into ‘parts’, repeating Lacan’s ‘Nous avons 
parlé de deux parties’; ‘La phenomenology du rêve del’injection d’Irma nous a fait distinguer 
deux parties’ (Lacan 1978:196).  If this grants order to the narrative, and enables the first 
‘part’ of the dream to be clearly differentiated from the second, it also undercuts this 
difference: the ‘part’ returns to both sides of the divide. This is equally true of ‘climax’. At one 
stage, Lacan has ‘culmine’, and as with Copjec, the term is repeated (190).  If the second 
half of the narrative is a fleeing from the real, with the first an encounter, both require ‘climax’ 
or ‘culmine’: ‘the climax of the second part, the triumphant pronouncement of the word 
trimethylamine, indicates that it is the word itself , or the symbolic itself, that is our salvation’ 
(Copjec [1994]: 120-121).  Thus, the initial encounter with the real obeys another law, again 
the law of structure, a structure that insists across even the bar between the two ‘parts’. 
What persists, and thus what cannot be contained within the individual part - that which 
somehow pertains to the ‘part’ of the real and that of the symbolic -, is ‘part’.   
 
 In insisting, then, ‘climax’ and ‘part’ fall outside the ‘space’ that we have read Copjec to 
privilege within her analysis. It might be claimed, therefore, that what falls outside Copjec’s 
‘space’ is the narrational frame, what might be taken to be an enabling, meaning-making 
structure. On these terms, what is outside the ‘space’ – and in this I am referencing the 
spaces of the encounter with the real and the fleeing into the symbolic – is the symbolic. In 
this, the symbolic can, however, also be read as repetitive, and as unread by Copjec, and, in 
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this, a gap within the signifying chain of her text. ‘Climax’ and ‘part’ are not, then, only to be 
returned to the text as the comforting, naturalised, sense-making supports to narrative, but 
also as the symbolic as ‘death drive’, in so far as this is understood by Copjec to be 
incomplete, unmasterable and ‘inextricably linked to repetition’ (45– 46, 54). If ‘climax’ and 
‘part’ are indeed read not in terms of a general structure transcending the particular ‘spaces’ 
of the dream, but rather as insisting terms within Freud’s text, then the appeal to the death 
drive can be further refined. Again, taking up a familiar Žižekean reading, it might be argued 
that it is not different ideas about or instances of ‘climax’ that are repeated, but rather the 
signifier ‘climax’.  
 
  Copjec’s analysis can be read to move towards such an understanding, interested as it is in 
the problem of the signifier as it relates to the climax, but only, I would suggest, in a way that 
problematises its own grounds.  Copjec argues that in ‘the climax of the second part of the 
dream’, as introduced above, the ‘salvation’ on offer is one of ‘repetition […] the signifier’s 
repeated attempt – and failure – to designate itself […]’ (121). Again, this, it is claimed, is a 
defence against the real; what Copjec forwards as the ‘correct response’ to anxiety: not the 
symbolic as interpretation, but a deathly repetition that incorporates the real as that which is 
excluded. It follows from these formulations that the ‘climax’ is only itself, ‘the word itself’, but 
in this is divided from itself: the word ‘trimethylamine’ is ‘the climax’; there is the climax, and 
there is ‘trimethylamine’, and somehow the one is also the other. Copjec’s argument here is 
that the word remains nothing other than itself, yet this is a condition not easily achieved:  as 
the ‘climax’ is located on the other side of the dream, in its first, purportedly non-symbolic 
half, what is to keep the ‘trimethylamine’ that is ‘the climax’ from the ‘part’ of the real?  A 
further, related, irony: it is the singularity of the word ‘trimethylamine’ that, for Copjec, results 
in the repetition that defines the symbolic. It is clear that in this argument the word cannot 
author itself, that it has no authority, and it is this that demands the endless repetition that 
registers the real that it consistently avoids. As the word is ‘the climax’, however, it is, as I 
have been arguing, caught up in another repetition, one that does not coincide with the 
symbolic of the absurd, isolated word, the symbolic of the signifier, but, for example, extends 
out into the enabling, unread condition of naturalised structure, that of the literary ‘climax’ 
that is positioned as an excess to the ‘spaces’ of both the symbolic and the real. Repetition 
does not keep to its right place. It repeats, and in this compromises the repetition that 
Copjec’s argument requires, the limited, deathly repetition of the absurd, isolated word within 
the space of the second half of the dream.   
  
  At this point a further difficulty still must be introduced: although Lacan does indeed repeat 
the term ‘culmine’, he does not stick to it in the way Copjec does ‘climax’. Against the 
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structural, dynamic ‘culmine’, Lacan introduces the geographic, spatial ‘sommet’, as well as 
‘un acme’. Following Žižek one possible response to this would be to say that what we have 
here, again, really is nothing other than the insistence of the signifier across Copjec’s text, 
that either the ‘climax’ that is repeated, or the chain of ‘culmine’, ‘acme’ and ‘sommet’, calls 
upon ‘the master signifier’, that point of pure difference that retrospectively occurs either 
when any given word is understood in various, contradictory ways, or through the 
displacement of synonyms. It might be suggested, therefore, that my fantasising analysis is 
unwittingly stuck in the ‘historicist’ play of the symbolic, caught up in the metonymical circuit 
of substitution, and thus unable to engage the additional ‘metaphorical’ dimension that is 
necessary to keep this in operation (the sense in which the deathless circuit of the symbolic 
carves out the real – that other dimension). To be clear, the problem with such a move is 
that it avoids Copjec’s location of the insistence of the signifier in one ‘climax’: it is ‘climax’ as 
‘trimethylamine’, the seemingly unauthored, discrete term that necessitates repetition. There 
cannot be another ‘climax’, at this stage of Copjec’s argument, if there are to be other 
climaxes. The symbolic must keep to its designated location as signifier, and not find 
repetition in, for example, a frame that is taken to fall outside the empty, meaningless 
repetition that defines the law and meaning. If we are to think of climax as ‘master signifier’, 
and thus as a site of pure difference, the difficulty is that difference must include the claim 
that there is no difference, no repetition, that there really is, indeed, one ‘climax’.   
 
 To read the terms of the text is to disrupt the stated differences that must be in place for 
Copjec’s argument to function, the sure designations of ‘space’, ‘object’, ‘symbolic’ that are 
necessary to the carving out of pure difference.  ‘Climax’ might be the isolated word, but in 
this it is also: insistent; something other than itself; located in a structure that has no place in 
the space of the real or the symbolic; that which insists across the space of the real and the 
symbolic, but not as the insistent signifier. 
 
To conclude:  if Copjec’s makes an unacknowledged appeal to structure in ‘climax’, there is 
a further appeal that is acknowledged: ‘climax’ as the unrealisable structure of death drive, 
what Žižek names the ‘symbolic real’. There is, therefore, something that falls outside of that 
structure: ‘climax’ as the common or garden structure with which we began. It follows that 
there is an unrecognised structure that exceeds the place of what we might term the ‘real 
structure’, and thus, death drive- like – exceeds the place of the death drive. (Copjec [1994]: 
1-14) ‘Climax’ is both that part of structure that is not part of structure (because passed over 
without comment), and that part of death drive which is (not) death drive (because it insists 
across what is and is not death drive). That is to say, I read ‘climax’ as the drive that cannot 
count as drive for there to be drive; the insistence that is not one. Within conventional 
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Žižekian and Copjecian analysis, there is, of course, crucially always an aspect of structure 
that does not count as such – ‘universal exception’ -, but in ‘Vampires, Breast-Feeding, and 
Anxiety’ there is also a part of impossible structure that does not count as impossible 
structure; that which is not simply drive, and in this is drive, because drive is what is the 
same in all symbolic universes, including the symbolic frame of ‘death drive’.  
 
v) Fleeing   
 
 It could be suggested that structure is problematic for Copjec in a more straightforward 
sense, as her argument requires a specific sequence of  precisely constructed events that 
are difficult to square with the text of ’Irma’s Injection’. In terms of Copjec’s reading of the 
dream, for example, it is crucial that there is an ‘anxiety-filled encounter with the object a’, 
that ‘the appearance of what ought to have remained hidden is a sickening, noxious sight’, 
experienced as a ‘constricted asphyxiating space’, and a ‘terrifying real’ from which  Freud 
‘flees’ and ‘turns’. Returning to Freud, however, I cannot read any specific appeal to anxiety, 
terror, revulsion, or constriction in the look down the throat. There is fear and restriction, but, 
remarkably, these are situated prior to the examination, ‘when she [Irma] answers: “If you 
only knew what pains I now have in the neck, stomach, and abdomen; I am drawn together” 
[…] I [Freud] am frightened and look at her.’ The constriction, for the narration, is in Irma’s 
claim to being tied or strung up (‘es schnürt mich zusamme’), and if Freud’s startled or 
fearful reaction is to be read as anxiety (‘Ich erschrecke und sehe sie an’), then, according to 
Copjec, this is prior to the encounter with ‘the real’. iv Anxiety is also prior to the look here, as 
Irma’s speaking of Freud’s failure to know her pain is the spur to his looking. Rather than 
located in the encounter with the imaginary real, that is, in Freud’s examination of Irma’s 
throat, fear can be read to coincide with not looking. Understood in this way, it is the other’s 
notification of a failed encounter, rather than the meeting with the abyss of the other, that 
provokes anxiety. 
 This move to secure location (the underside, we might argue, of the limit that is necessary 
to the brilliant, vertiginous readings Copjec offers [Copjec 2015, 39 - 63) can be read also in 
the appeal to ‘flight’, ‘flee[ing]’, and ‘turning away’. Despite being the definitive actions within 
the ethics Copjec is proposing, I would argue that they are disruptively difficult to place. We 
might begin to work this through with the claim that the ‘second part of the dream is defined 
by a turning away from the object a that erupted in the first part’. What defines the second 
part of the dream is thus something that cannot be contained within it. There is a definition in 
excess of ‘part’. And as this definition is a turning away from a previous eruption, the second 
‘part’ is ghosted by the first. It is not, then, that the second ‘part’ only repeats the first as 
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‘part’, as read above, but that there is a turning away that cannot be contained within either 
part. We read this difficulty again in the claim that ‘The abruptness of the transition (from the 
anxious to the comic mode) means that Freud flees from the real – Irma, her white scabs, 
the unconscious – into the symbolic community of his fellow doctors’ (120).  Freud flees ‘into’ 
a symbolic community, and ‘from’ the real, and as such, this is a fleeing that insists across 
the division of ‘parts’. Copjec’s reading is rooted in a split between the real and the symbolic 
that is then explicitly problematised through the return of the real to the symbolic. I am 
suggesting, however, that there is something that must be added to both scenes, a fleeing 
and a turning away that is necessary to each, yet wholly situated in neither. Fleeing is not 
the real, within Copjec’s analysis. It is a flight from the real. Fleeing is not the symbolic either, 
however, in so far as Copjec has Freud fleeing ‘into’ this.  It is a flight that I read as an 
unread yet required excess both to the two scenes and the subsequent problematisationof 
their neat division within Copjec’s account. In order to question the relationship between 
parts, Copjec must get safely to the point of danger, overlooking the supplement that is 
necessary, yet anathema, to her structure.  
 Such difficulties can be read also in the account of ‘Irma’s Injection’ offered by Slavoj Žižek 
in Less Than Nothing. Such repetition should not, in one sense, surprise: Žižek is Copjec’s 
most celebrated fellow traveller, who reviewed Read My Desire as ‘theoretically correct’, and 
his ideas, although kept at something of a distance thus far, have from the first shaped the 
debates with which this present article has engaged.v As mentioned above, Copjec 
understands the dream to repeat across a diverse collection of texts, reading what is, I would 
argue, sometimes and sometimes not its constitute nothing insisting within Dracula, La Jetée, 
and Rebecca. Žižek also has repeated recourse to the dream. Like the little boy coerced into 
seeing his grandparents, or the gaze of Arbogast in Psycho, it is one of Žižek’s favoured 
examples, a narrative to which he returns many times within his writing, its ‘universality’ 
claimed as established through its failure to exhaust or fully signify itself. vi Within Žižek’s 
writing, ‘Irma’s Injection’ is most often called upon in discussions of fantasy. In ‘From Virtual 
Reality to the Virtualisation of Reality’ and ‘Freud Lives’, for example, the second part of the 
dream is understood as a maintenance of fantasy, an avoidance of the real, and this is taken 
to be repeated in Freud’s account of a bereaved father woken by a horrifying dream in which 
his son confronts him with the words ‘Father, can’t you see I am burning’. vii The father 
wakes up not to escape the dreaming fantasy, but to dwell in a reality that stands against the 
real of the dream. With this claim, a tension can be introduced between the understanding of 
the second scene in the work of Copjec and  Žižek, with the former figuring it as a holding on 
to the real, rather than a more straightforward flight from it. In Less Than Nothing, however, 
Žižek offers a slightly extended account, which brings his reading more in line with Copjec’s: 
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the dream is figured as split, and the real is located as much in the second part as it is the 
first. The reference is introduced within a discussion of the modalities of the negation of 
negation, in which Žižek introduces one variant, named ‘the “Irma-matrix,’ the logic of which 
he claims ‘underlies’ Freud’s dream of ‘Irma’s Injection’ (Žižek 2013). The dream begins, 
writes Žižek, with a conversation between Freud and Irma, in the course of which:  
 Freud gets closer to her, approaches her face and looks deep into her mouth, 
confronting the horrible sight of the red flesh in her throat. At this point of unbearable 
horror, the tone of the dream changes, the horror all of a sudden passes into comedy 
[…] which enables the dreamer to avoid an encounter with the true trauma. It may 
appear that the triad of the ‘Irma –matrix’ is that of ‘IRS’: first the imaginary duality; 
then, its aggravation in the abyss of the Real; finally, the symbolic resolution. However, 
a more precise reading discloses the fact that we get two Reals in the dream, in that 
each of its two parts concludes with a figuration of the Real. In the conclusion of the 
first part […] , this is obvious: the look into Irma’s throat renders the Real in the guise 
of primordial flesh […]  in the second part, the comic symbolic exchange or interplay 
between the three doctors also ends up with the Real, this time in its opposite aspect – 
the Real of writing, of the meaningless formula of trimethylamine. The difference 
hinges on the different starting point: if we start with the imaginary (the mirror-
confrontation of Freud and Irma), we get the Real in its imaginary dimension, as a 
horrifying primordial image that cancels imagery itself; if we start with the symbolic (the 
exchange of arguments between the three doctors), we get the signifier itself 
transformed into the Real of a meaningless letter of formula. These two figures are the 
two opposite aspects of the Real: the abyss of the primordial Life-Thing and the 
meaningless letter or formula […] (Žižek, 2013, 479). 
 As with Copjec’s reading, there  is a division of the dream into two ‘parts’, with part not read 
as an issue within discussions of structure, and not implicated in what problematises the 
mundane division of the dream. This is held instead within the radical doubleness of the 
same, the notion that it is with pure repetition that the genuine difference arises; a difference 
that does not reside in finalised identity, but rather in the way in which the same narrative 
can, from a different starting point, result in opposing notions of the real. My issue is not 
necessarily with this understanding, but rather the reading of structure that it requires, one 
that, again, and ironically, can be read to repeat that offered by Copjec. Take for example, 
the claim that it is precisely at ‘this point’ of unbearable horror that the tone of the dream 
changes. Firstly, of course, we can question the location of unbearable horror within the look 
down the throat, but there are further issues here. What does it mean, for example, to locate 
the change in tone at the point of horror? This is a point of excess, located from a narrational 
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position other than its own, and holding within it the alteration that extends beyond its 
borders. Moreover, it is here, at this point, that ‘the horror all of a sudden passes into 
comedy’. Again, this is a passage that cannot be wholly located on either side of the dream, 
and the horror of the first part strangely persists within the comedy that supplants it.  
 
 There is, however, a need for a cleaner separation between the two parts in Žižek’s 
argument. As pointed out above, the pure difference of the structure hinges on the 
alternative points of entry: if we start with the part of the symbolic, we get one real, if we start 
with the imaginary part, we get another. But, as my reading of Copjec has already suggested, 
the ability to start in this way is far from secure: the symbolic starts already ghosted by the 
imaginary, just as the imaginary calls upon the symbolic, and not only in the wider sense of 
its retrospective narrative frame. Copjec and Žižek need to understand the dream to be 
structured in a certain way, and thus cannot admit readings that would disturb this structure.  
   
 It is my contention, then, that additions to the prescribed ‘matrix’ can be read, in so far as 
these repeat across the engagements with ‘Irma’s Injection’ offered by Copjec and Žižek. As 
such, we can return a further addition to this repeated matrix: flight. To flee or to take flight, 
Copjec argues, is to repeat, and to repeat is to flee. Or, more precisely, fleeing is not the real, 
as it is a flight from the real, yet fleeing is also the real, the real of unsublimated repetition. 
As such, fleeing, within Copjec’s analysis, can also be read in terms of the repetition of 
‘Irma’s Injection’ in and across the work of both theorists. But fleeing, in my reading, also 
puts pay to the security of the structural opposition that, in its repetition and problematisation, 
forms the ‘Irma Matrix’: flight explodes the matrix into which it can be subsumed. I am 
thinking here of flight as a structure that is an affront to structure: repeated, persistent, 
differentiated, yet a pure difference too; flight as the very repetitive structure of the death 
drive, yet returning to upset even this affront to structure; flight not only as symbolic real, and 
symbolic against the real, but what persists across both, problematising even the established 
problematisation of their opposition; flight repeated, we might say, in the fleeing of Copjec 
and Žižek from the problem of flight, a flight from flight, and thus, perhaps, a repetition of it; 
flight as the displacement and repetition of Irma as Dracula, the dream of the burning child, 
and the like, the flight from interpretation; my repetition of (flight from) this in the shift of focus 
from Copjec to Žižek; the flight  (under-read  in this present article) from ‘flee[ing] to ‘turning 
away’.  
 Another way to think about flight here might call upon Freud’s celebrated discussion within 
‘Irma’s Injection’ of ‘the navel of the dream’: an impediment to, and a promise of, further 
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analysis; a knot that cannot be unravelled. But here a further, and, for this article, final, 
difficulty can be introduced. 
vi) Conclusion: omphalus 
 Thus far, I have only briefly touched upon the rejection of deconstruction shared by Copjec 
and Žižek in their discussions of ‘Irma’s Injection’. In ‘The Limits of Hegel’, however, there is 
particular commitment to give Jacques Derrida his due. Thus, deconstruction is taken to 
follow a Freudian investment in contingency that draws attention to the limits of a certain 
dialectic approach:  
‘What would Hegel have made of Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection, the interpretation 
of which unearths a kind of superposition of multiple interpretative lines […] what 
would Hegel have said about a dream in which the remains of the day (Tagesreste) 
are connected to the core of the dream only through verbal or similar associations’? 
(487)  
 Difficulties arise, it is claimed, only in so far deconstructive analysis limits itself to reading 
‘endless difference, the dissemination that can never be sublated or re-appropriated’ (482), 
to the exclusion of: 
The virtual in its proper dimension, as a possibility which already qua possibility 
possesses its own reality; pure difference is not actual, it does not concern different 
actual properties of a thing or differences among things, its status is purely virtual, it is 
a difference which takes place at its purest precisely when nothing changes in actuality 
(481 – 2). 
 
 Žižek is working here not to simply shore up such oppositions, but to draw out the ‘virtual’ 
structural aspects necessary to Freudian contingency, and the pathology that returns to 
Hegelian formality (480 -90). It is this operation that leads finally to an engagement with the 
strange logic of Lacanian drive, figured in terms of the Mobius band. viiiFor Žižek, drive, as 
opposed to desire, does not turn around a missing object, as ‘for a drive, the “Thing itself” is 
a circulation around the void (or rather, the hole)’. (498) This might suggest the triumph of 
pure formality, a movement finding satisfaction in itself alone, and thus requiring no 
pathological ‘content’.  The truth is the opposite: such geometry is caught up in ‘the paradox’ 
that ‘that pure repetition […] is sustained precisely by its impurity, by the persistence of a 
contingent pathological element to which the movement of repetition gets and remains stuck’ 
and it is in this way that, ‘at its most radical, the Lacanian object a […] is not a substantial 
element disturbing the formal mechanism of symbolization, but a purely formal curvature of 
16 
 
symbolization itself’ (500). Drive, the excess pleasure of the movement around the pure 
difference of the single-sided Mobius strip, might seem to do away with the contingent 
differences in which Derrida is taken to be invested, yet this is to avoid the contingent or 
pathological aspect of the movement, the sense in which it is like a record stuck within a 
particular groove: ‘every idealizing /universalizing negativity has to be attached to a singular, 
contingent, “pathological” content which serves as its sinthome in the Lacanian sense (if the 
sinthome is unravelled or disintergrated , universality disappears)’ (501).   
 Thinking back over the various accounts of ‘Irma’s Injection’ read thus far, we are in a 
position to draw out certain tensions. Thus, for example, the real, for Copjec, is constriction, 
yet the repetition she positions against this is, for Žižek, attached to the knot of the sinthome. 
Knot against knot. If in one sense this supports Copjec’s reading, with its notion of the real 
returning as the symbolic flight from the real, it also, as it were, introduces a further loop to 
the knot of flight, an additional contingency to disrupt the sure structure required to stage 
Copjec’s elegant reversals. Alternatively, we could turn to the death drive, which, for Žižek 
here, is a ‘“sticking”’, an interruption of ‘flow’, with flight seemingly the opposite of this. For 
Copjec, in contrast, flight/fleeing/turning away is repetition as death drive (501). Pharmakon, 
then: an original division; read across both theorists, flight is and is not ‘immobilization’ (503). 
Might one not be increasingly tempted at this juncture to call upon ‘the navel of the dream’? 
Not so for Žižek and Copjec. For all their interest in ‘Irma’s Injection’, the limit of discourse, 
and the structure of the dream, neither theorist mentions that particular knot.  
 It is at this point that we might turn to a text (published two years after Read my Desire) that 
is not mentioned by Žižek, surprisingly, one might think, considering his interest in repetition, 
the constitutive limit, origin as impossible difference, knots, and the limits of Derridan 
analysis: Derrida’s Resistances of Psychoanalysis. If , in ‘The Limits of Hegel’, Žižek seems 
to be at his most open to the possibilities of the deconstructive project, might we 
nevertheless read here a turning away or a flight from it? Perhaps not: there is, after all, no 
horrified recoil on Žižek’s part. What we have instead is arguably a non-encounter with 
Derrida and ‘the navel of the dream’ that is the focus of his reading of ‘Irma’s Injection’ in 
Resistances of Psychoanalysis.  There are limits to this line of argument, however, best 
introduced through a quotation from Derrida’s text: 
[…] when one seeks to determine the unity of this concept [‘resistance’] , which serves 
as a semantic support or paradigmatic reference for the five forms of resistance, one 
encounters a ‘resistance to analysis’ that figures both the most resistant resistance, 
resistance par excellence, hyperbolic resistance, and the one that disorganizes the 
very principle, the constitutive idea of psychoanalysis as analysis of resistances […] 
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The paradox that interests me here is that this repetition compulsion, as hyperbolic 
paradigm of the series, as absolute resistance, risks destroying the meaning of the 
series to which it is supposed to assure meaning (this is an effect of formal logic […]), 
but still more ironically, it defines no doubt a resistance that has no meaning – and that, 
moreover, is not a resistance […] the repetition compulsion does not give its meaning 
to the four other forms of resistance for two reasons: it has no meaning (death drive)  
and it resists analysis in the form of non-resistance, for the primary reason it is itself of  
an analytic structure or vocation […] We have here returned very close to the navel of 
the dream, to the place where the desire for death and desire tout court call for and 
speak the analysis they prohibit, speak to it by saying nothing, respond without 
responding, without saying yes or no, as in ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’. To every demand, 
question, pressure, request, order it responds without responding, neither active nor 
passive ‘I would prefer not to’ (23 - 24).   
 Derrida, so close to the navel, was surely never more Žižekian. Rather than turning from 
questions of formal logic, as  both  Žižek and Copjec claim in their chapters is the case with 
deconstruction, Resistances of Psychoanalysis engages precisely the problem of the 
‘universal exception’ that is central to their work. The exception here is without content or 
meaning: very much the Žižekian and Copjecian death drive. And the ethics that are read 
from this are those of Melville’s hero, with Derrida quoting the words that have, of course, 
become something of  a catchphrase for Žižek, an encapsulation of the political project he 
wishes to pursue: ‘I would prefer not to’. For sure, this ends in the navel, and thus introduces 
a limit that is off-limit to both Copjec and Žižek, both as a repressed that I have returned, and 
a dense, primary textual différance that seems at odds with the neat impossibility of the 
Mobius strip.  For all that, such differences do not enable us to entirely or confidently turn 
from questions of repetition, resistance, turning, and flight.   
  I am not, at this late stage, about to take up a position within the Derrida/Lacan debates 
(Žižek 2011; Sigler 2010; Hurst 2008; Ziarek 1997; Johnson 1977). Yes:  I take flight. I will 
conclude, instead, only with the following questions. Are we, in light of our analysis of 
Copjec’s ‘Irma’s Injection’, to read Žižek’s discussion of Derrida in ‘The Limits of Hegel’ as a 
flight of avoidance or of fidelity? When we think through this choice, should we call upon 
‘sticking’, ‘fleeing’, ‘constricting’, ‘turning away’, a combination of the four, or something else?  
What law should we follow in this choice? How confident are we in the separation of these 
actions? Is flight here what secures opposition (for example: Derrida/Žižek; the mouth/the 
doctors), or what also makes impossible such sure divisions (flight as unacknowledged 
supplement to structure, or ‘universal exception’)?  And if impossibility is indeed enabled by 
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flight as death drive/ pure repetition/formality, what is to ensure the separation of this 
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i I have kept to Copjec formulation of ‘the real’ rather than ‘the Real’.  
ii Reformulated in the terms favoured by Copjec: how, with the knowledge that if ‘we delve below 
[the superficial/symbolic], we are sure to come up empty’ (13), can we be sure that ‘appearance and 
being never coincide’ (13)? I am not questioning this line of argument in general, but, rather, 
suggesting that any real that is to be read in the way must also fail to coincide with the real: there is an 
underside even to this underside.   
iii I do not read Copjec’s ‘equivalence’ as that of Laclau. Copjec’s formulations, within the chapter 
that concerns this present article, suggests a positive, content-based ‘equivalence’ (Copjec 2016: 118). 
For a tentative reading of this issue, see Cocks (2020).   
iv See Freud [1900]. For a detailed reading of English translation of ‘Irma’s Injection’, see Mahony 
(2001.) 
v  The question of the same is, of course, what is at issue. I am very much caught in what I critique 
throughout (flight?), but at this stage, what problematises my reading is its implicit appeal to shared 
grounds (that is: nothing) between these theorists. The quotation from the back cover blurb of Copjec 
(2015). 
vivi See, for example, Žižek (2009c: 101 -3); Flisfeder (2012). 
vii  Another article (at least) could be written on the repetition of ‘Irma’s Injection’ in Žižek, but see 
also Žižek (2008), Žižek (2008b: 25), where the imaginary real is read in terms of a ‘mask of horror’, 
and Žižek and Milbank (2009) , where the dream, is taken to be repeated in the Book of Job. I 
acknowledge here also that much more could be written on the ‘virtual’ structure of Irma’s Injection 
within Žižek (2013).  
viii A move shared by Copjec (2015). 
